Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1886 and 1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory Purpose? by unknown
BYU Law Review
Volume 1978 | Issue 4 Article 2
11-1-1978
Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions
Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1886 and
1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory
Purpose?
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1886 and 1870: Disproportionate Impact or
Discriminatory Purpose?, 1978 BYU L. Rev. 1030 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1978/iss4/2
Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Actions 
Brought Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 
1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory 
Purpose? 
Competing notions about the meaning of equality have in- 
creasingly polarized the civil rights enforcement effort.' In spite 
of the "difficulty of the  issue[^],"^ the Supreme Court will con- 
tinue the debate over equality this term.3 One of the issues con- 
fronting the Court in County of Los Angeles v. Davis4 involves 
allocation of the burden of proof in actions brought under the 
Civil Rights Acts of 18665 and 1870:% the plaintiffs initial bur- 
l. Professor Brest notes that the "policy of the 1960's provided common ground for 
persons having divergent aims. Disappointment with its results exposed latent differences 
and eroded the coalition that had been responsible for much of the earlier progess in civil 
rights." Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimi- 
nation Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976). For a discussion of the "latent [policyl 
differences" that contributed to the polarization of the civil rights movement, see id. a t  
2-3. 
For a historical overview of civil rights enforcement efforts since the Civil War, see 
R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD (1947); CIVIL RIGHTS 
AND THE AMERICAN NEGRO (A. Blaustein & R. Zangrando ed. 1968); N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE 
DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975); L. GRAGLU, DISASTER BY 
DECREE (1976); R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976); M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, A CENTURY 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS (1961). A good bibliographic note on the race problem appears in H. 
ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 447-48 (1977). 
2. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2766 (1978) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting). Justice Brennan had specific reference to affirmative 
action, an issue closely related to the subject matter of this Comment. 
Professor Brest has noted that 
[off the civil rights issues that have emerged during the past decade, two of 
the most controversial and important involve the propriety of granting racial 
preferences to traditionally disadvantaged minorities and the operational relev- 
ance of the fact that a color-blind practice has a disproportionate adverse im- 
pact on the members of a racial minority group. 
Brest, supra note 1, at 4-5. Affirmative action and disproportionate impact analyses are 
related not only because of their importance to discrimination law, but because they seek 
to implement similar values. See Brest, supra note 1, passim; Comment, Proof of Racially 
Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arling- 
ton Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.X.L.L. REV. 725, 727-30 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Proof of Purpose]. 
3. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Weber, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401 (U.S. Dec. 12, 
1978) (No. 78-435), granting cert. to 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977); County of Los Angeles 
v. Davis, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553), granting cert. to 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
4. 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553), granting cert. to 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977). 
5. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). 
6. Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140'(1870). 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
den of proof satisfied when it is established "that a color-blind 
practice has a disproportionate adverse impact on the members 
of a racial minority group"?' The issue is particularly important 
in view of the expansive interpretations the early civil rights en- 
actments have been given over the past decade? Unhampered by 
many of the restrictive substantive and procedural limitations of 
other civil rights  measure^,^ 42 U.S.C. 9 8 19811° and 1982,'l which 
7. Brest, supra note 1, a t  4-5. 
8. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 forbids discrimination aga in~t  whites as well as nonwhites); Runyon v. 
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits discrimination in pri- 
vate, nonsectarian schools); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) 
(Civil Rights Act of 1866 reaches private discrimination); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven 
Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973) (private swimming club's discriminatory guest pol- 
icy invalidated under Acts of 1866 and 1870); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 
US.  229 (1969) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits private recreational association from 
discriminatorily withholding membership conveyed incident to a lease); Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibits private discrimina- 
tion in the sale or rental of property). 
Commentators have discussed extensively the "rediscovery" and subsequent judicial 
development of the early civil rights enactments. See, e.g., Larson, The Development of 
Section I981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment, 7 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 56, 59-67 (1972); Note, Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially 
Neutral Practices- What Approach Under 42 U. S. C. Sections 1981 and 1982?, 1977 DUKE 
L.J. 1267, 1274-78 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Disproportionate Impact]; Note, Section 
1981 and Private Discrimination: An Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1024, 1035-43 (1972); Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault 
on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L. REV. 412, 412- 
33 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Scope]; Comment, A Prohibition Against 
Private Discrimination: Section 1981, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 677 (1978); Comment, Private 
Discriminations Under the 1866 Civil Rights Act: In Search of Principled Constitutional 
and Policy Limits, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 139, 149-72 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private 
Discriminations]; Comment, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, 615-21 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Racial 
Discrimination in Employment]. 
Justice Powell recognized the difficulty of limiting the scope of the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 186-88 (Powell, J., concurring). See also id. at 212 
(White, J., dissenting) (admission standards of "[s]ocial clubs, black and white, and 
associations designed to further the interests of blacks or whites" might be challenged 
under the 1866 Act). 
9. For example, unlike the Reconstruction Acts, title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 4 2000e to 2000e-17 (l976), does not cover employers engaging fewer than 
15 employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or 
preceding calendar year, bona fide private membership clubs, Indian tribes, and the 
United States Government. Id. § 2000e (b). Religious groups employing individuals in 
religion-oriented work are also exempted. Id. § 2000e-1. See also Johnson v. Alexander, 
572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978) (Armed Forces not an "employer" for purposes of title VTI; 
case was heard under Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
Unlike the 19th-century legislation, the Fair Housing Act, title VIII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. $8 3601-3619 (1976), does not cover in certain circumstances the 
sale or rental of single-family dwellings by a private, individual owner. Id. § 3603(b). Title 
VIII also exempts room rentals to religious or private groups. Id. $ 3607. 
Procedural prerequisites and substantive remedies under titles VII and Vm are less 
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are derived from the Reconstruction civil rights a~ts,~Qotentially 
reach discriminatory conduct not covered by any other statutory 
or constitutional provision.I3 
In Washington v. Davis,I4 a decision that, according to one 
commentator, "began a new era in civil rights law,"I5 the Su- 
preme Court held that a more stringent standard of proof was 
required in neutral factor cases brought under the fourteenth 
amendment than in cases arising under title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.16 Under the Constitution, plaintiffs must pro- 
vide evidence of discriminatory intent." Under title VII, evidence 
of a disproportionate racial impact is sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case? The lower courts have divided on whether to 
align the 1866 and 1870 Acts with the constitutional standard or 
with the title VII standard.lg 
This Comment will compare the origin and development of 
the two principal evidentiary theories, discriminatory purpose 
and disproportionate impact. The response of the lower courts to 
Washington v. Davis in cases brought under the Civil Rights Acts 
of 1866 and 1870 will be discussed, and the legal arguments for 
and against aligning the Reconstruction Acts with the fourteenth 
amendment standard will be analyzed. Finally, the conflicting 
favorable than similar provisions under the 19th-century Acts. See Greenfield & Kates, 
Mexican Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. 
L. REV. 662, 665 & n.19 (1975). 
10. 42 U.S.C. 8 1981 (1976), entitled "Equal rights under the law," states that: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same 
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed- 
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac- 
tions of every kind, and to no other. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976), entitled "Property rights of citizens," provides that: "All 
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real 
and personal property." 
12. For an analysis of the historical link between $4  1981 and 1982 and the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, see note 94 infra. 
13. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) ( 5  1982 applies to private 
as well as governmental conduct); Comment, Civil Rights-42 U.S.C. $ 1981: Keeping a 
Compromised Promise of Equality to Blacks, 29 U .  FLA. L. REV. 318, 321 & n.27 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Promise of Equality]. 
14. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
15. Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory 
Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961, 961. 
16. 42 U.S.C. §§  2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). 
17. 426 U.S. a t  239, 244-45. 
18. Id. at  246-47. 
19. See notes 58-72 and accompanying text infra. 
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notions of equality that underlie the two theories will be com- 
pared in order to determine the appropriate evidentiary standard 
for section 1981 and 1982 actions. 
Discriminatory motivation has long been a. key element in 
establishing a cause of action in race discrimination law." Be- 
cause the early cases brought under the Fteconstruction amend- 
ments2' and Enforcement Actsn involved blatantly discrimina- 
20. According to Professor Brest, "[tlhe Court's entire line of civil rights precedent, 
beginning in 1879 with Strauder v. West Virginia, [I00 U.S. 303 (1880),] explicitly turns 
on the race-dependence of the practices invalidated." Brest, supra note 1, at 27 (footnote 
omitted). See also Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconsti- 
tutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 99-102. But see Ely, Legislative and 
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208-09 (1970). 
21. The thirteenth amendment declares that 
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for 
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in part: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic- 
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
Section 5 of the amendment empowers Congress to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article." The fifteenth amendment states: 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
Id. amend. XV. 
22. Seven civil rights acts were passed by Congress during the Reconstruction period 
enforcing the rights created by the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments. 
They include, in order of their passage: Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Act 
of May 21, 1866, ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (making kidnapping for purpose of enslavement 
illegal); Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (prohibiting peonage); Civil Rights 
Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (guaranteeing the right to vote and the right to full and 
equal benefit of the laws); Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (regulating elections); 
Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (providing for enforcement of fourteenth 
amendment); Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (providing civil and criminal 
penalties for discrimination in accommodations, transportation, public amusements, and 
jury selection). The current versions of these Acts may be found in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981- 
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tory practices, the existence of an illicit motive was rarely dis- 
puted? In traditional racial discrimination cases today, however, 
proof of discriminatory motivation is essential. 
A. Proof of Discriminatory Purpose in  the 
Traditional Racial Discrimination Case 
The traditional racial discrimination case involves the dis- 
parate treatment of similarly situated individuals.14 The most 
recent formulation of the discriminatory purpose theory in cases 
involving disparate treatment appeared in McDonnell Douglas 
1983, 1985-1992, 1994 (1976). 
For a discussion of the early history of the Civil War amendments and the Enforce- 
ment Acts, see 6 C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 89- 
133, 253-365, 1117-300 (1971); M. KONVITZ & T. LESKES, supra note 1, at  41-101. 
23. The jury selection cases brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1875 involved the 
deliberate exclusion by state officials of blacks from jury service. See, e.g., Ex parte 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880); Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), had to do with 
the denial of admission of blacks to an inn, a theater, and a railroad. And Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), involved the forcible ejection of a man from a coach 
reserved for whites because he was one-eighth Negro. 
Other early cases involving similar instances of overt discrimination arose in the fields 
of public education, see, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (Chinese girl living 
in Mississippi prohibited from attending the only high school in the county because of her 
race); Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528 (1899) (county board of 
education in Georgia closed black high school, and parents of black students sought an 
order requiring the board to reduce expenditures for corresponding white high school), 
voting rights, see, e.g., Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (statute authorizing Demo- 
cratic Party executive committee to determine party membership invalidated where the 
committee barred blacks from party membership); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) 
(Texas statute prohibiting Negros from participating in Democratic Party primary elec- 
tions invalidated), housing, see, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (discrimina- 
tory covenant); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (discriminatory city zoning ordi- 
nance), travel, see, e.g., Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (black passenger 
on the Southern Railway denied food service because of race); Morgan v. Virginia, 328 
U.S. 373 (1946) (black woman asked to move to back of bus under Virginia segregation 
law); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (black Congressman denied first-class 
seat on train pursuant to Arkansas law), and graduate school cases, see, e.g., McLaurin 
v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (black graduate student required to sit 
in designated areas of classrooms); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) 
(black denied admission to University of Missouri Law School because of race). 
24. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 15 (1976). In the 
employment field, for example, traditional discrimination cases generally deal with prac- 
tices involving discharge, discipline, promotion, transfer, lay off, failure to train, or retal- 
iation. Such cases, regardless of the jurisdictional basis of the cause of action, have 
generally required proof of discriminatory intent. Id. a t  1153-54 & nn.5-11. See generally 
id. a t  15-17, 23-25. While traditional discriminatory purpose (disparate treatment) cases 
usually involve single plaintiffs, they may be brought as class actions. Id. a t  1157-58. 
The disparate treatment theory has also been applied in title VII cases, see McDon- 
nell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and in actions brought under Q 1981, 
see, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500, 505 n.11 (6th Cir. 1974); Milton v. Bell 
Laboratories, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 502 (D.N.J. 1977). 
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Corp. v. Green,25 an action brought under title VII by a black 
mechanic and laboratory technician who charged that his dis- 
missal was racially motivated." The McDonnell Court held that 
a plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of employment dis- 
crimination by proving four facts: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and 
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking appli- 
cants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and 
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com- 
plainant's  qualification^.^ 
Although the Court noted that this test "is not necessarily applic- 
able in every respect to differing factual  situation^,"^^ the essen- 
tial inquiry in disparate treatment cases like McDonnell is always 
the same-whether the conduct of the defendant was "racially 
premised? The plaintiff must "demonstrate by competent evi- 
dence that the [stated] reasons for his rejection were in fact a 
coverup for a racially discriminatory decision. 
The plaintiff need not provide direct proof of intent, how- 
ever.31 Circumstantial evidence will suffice. For example, statis- 
tics may provide some evidence of intent (or lack of intent) to 
discriminate." In fact, noted authorities on employment discrim- 
ination law have asserted that plaintiffs may find the "burden of 
establishing a prima facie case" under this theory "relatively 
easy."" Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the 
burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for the [plaintiffs] rejection. "34 
25. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
26. Id. at 794. 
27. Id. at 802 (footnote omitted). 
28. Id. at 802 n.13. 
29. Id. at 805 n.18. 
30. Id. at 805. 
31. See Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 175-77 
(1st Cir.), vacated on othergrounds and remanded per curium, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978); Peters 
v. Jefferson Chem. Co., 516 F.2d 447,449 (5th Cir. 1975); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra 
note 24, at 16. 
32. B. S c ~ m  & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 24, at 1154-56. 
33. Id. a t  1155. The critical issue is whether the defendant's allegedly valid reason 
for his conduct was a "pretext." Id. a t  1156 & n.31. See Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 
740-42; notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra. 
34. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. The Supreme Court has 
recently reaffirmed McDonnell's definition of the defendant's burden of production. See 
Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978); Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2948-51 (1978). See generally 2 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMENATION §§ 50.00-.40 (1975 & Supp. 1978). 
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B. Disproportionate Impact: Neutral Factors and 
the Present Effects of Past Discrimination 
The courts have created an exception to the traditional dis- 
criminatory purpose rule in "neutral factor" cases. Neutral fac- 
tors include objective selection criteria such as standardized 
tests, credit ratings, work histories, academic and professional 
records, and minimum height and weight req~irements,~"hich 
are presumably employed without intent to discriminate on the 
basis of race. Such factors often disqualify minorities at higher 
rates than groups that have not been historically disadvantaged 
and as a result tend to perpetuate the effects of past discrimina- 
tion. Because the discriminatory purpose theory focuses on illicit 
motive, it fails to compensate for inequalities created by the use 
of such race-neutral factors. The attention of the courts in neutral 
factor cases therefore has shifted from discriminatory motivation 
to discriminatory  consequence^.^^ 
1. Genesis of the disproportionate impact theory 
By applying the statistical techniques used in early jury serv- 
ice cases,37 and by utilizing the concept of the prima facie case," 
the courts formulated a new evidentiary theory for neutral factor 
cases: disproportionate impact.3g The theory developed initially 
in equal protection race discrimination cases, then in title VlI 
35. Professor Larson defines neutral factors as "those containing no specific reference 
to race." Additional examples from the employment field include aptitude tests, educa- 
tion requirements, professional and academic employment tests, arrest and conviction 
records, garnishment and bankruptcy records, drug history, and length of experience 
requirements. 3 A. LAR~ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 73.00 (1977). Facially neutral 
selection practices have also been challenged in housing cases, see, e.g., Boyd v. LeFrak 
Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975), and jury service 
cases, see, e.g., Casteneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977). 
36. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of 
Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1972). 
For a comparison of the disproportionate impact and discriminatory purpose theories, 
see Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 174 & n.8, 175 
(1st Cir.), vacated and remanded per curium, 99 S. Ct. 295 (1978). See also Dispropor- 
tionate Impact, supra note 8, at 1268 n.4. 
37. See, e.g., Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1947); Hill v. Texas, 316 
U.S. 400, 405-06 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 594-98 (1935). 
38. See Fessler & Haar, Beyond the Wrong Side of the Tracks: Municipal Services 
in the Interstices of Procedure, 6 HARV. C.R.X.L.L. REV. 441, 447 & nn.22-23 (1971); 
Larson, supra note 8, a t  91-93; Comment, Employment Discrimination-Washington v. 
Davis: Splitting the Causes of Action Against Racial Discrimination in Employment, 8 
LOY. CHI. L.J. 225, 235 & n.50 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Splitting]. 
39. See generally 3 A. LARSON, supra note 35, $ 6  74.00-.64; Perry, The Dispropor- 
tionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 553-62 (1977). 
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employment discrimination cases.40 In 1971, the Supreme Court 
legitimized the use of the disproportionate impact theory in title 
VII cases in Griggs v. Duke Power C O . ~ ~  Blacks in that case chal- 
lenged the power company's policy requiring that applicants have 
a high school diploma or pass an intelligence test in order to be 
considered for employment or transfer to higher paying jobs. 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger emphasized 
Congress' intention, expressed in the language of title VII, to 
"remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an iden- 
tifiable group of white employees over other  employee^."^^ 
In many cases, the Griggs disproportionate impact standard 
significantly reduces the plaintiff's initial burden of production. 
Rather than inquire into the defendant's motives, the plaintiff 
need only show that the challenged practice has a racially dispro- 
portionate impact. In the employment-testing field, the theory 
serves to implement Congress' policy of assisting historically dis- 
advantaged groups 6y outlawing selection criteria that disfavor 
minorities unless they are shown to be essential to the operation 
of the business.43 
2. Limiting the scope of the impact theory 
The Griggs ruling prompted a wide application of the new 
evidentiary theory in neutral factor race discrimination cases 
brought under a variety of constitutional and statutory provi- 
sions." In June of 1976, this trend was dramatically interrupted? 
40. Splitting, supra note 38, a t  236. For a comprehensive overview of the effect of 
disproportionate impact analysis on title VII law, see Seelman, Employment Testing 1,aw: 
The Federal Agencies Go Public with the Problems, 10 URB. LAW. 1 (1978). 
41. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Blumrosen, supra note 36, a t  62 (Griggs' redefinition of 
discrimination in terms of consequences termed new development in employment discrim- 
ination law). But cf. 3 A. LARSON, supra note 35, $ 75.31 (facially neutral tests were 
invalidated before Griggs); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 24, a t  5 & n.9 (generally 
tracing disproportionate impact theory to Griggs, but noting that standards similar to 
those articulated in Griggs were applied in Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 
(C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd as modified, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972)). 
42. 401 U.S. a t  429-30. The Court repeatedly emphasized that title VII's dispropor- 
tionate impact standard originated in the language and purpose of the statute. Id. at  429- 
31. 
43. Id. at  430-31. See also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975). 
For a general discussion of test validation and the "business necessity" requirement, 
see 3 A. LARSON, supra note 35, $4 77.00-.50, 78.00-.52; B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra 
note 24, a t  65-75. See also Lerner, Washington v. Davis: Quantity, Quality and Equality 
in Employment Testing, 1976 SUP. CT. REV. 263 (1976); SHOBEN, Probing the Discrimina- 
tory Effects of Employer Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under 
Title VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975). 
44. See Schwemm, supra note 15, a t  987-1000; Note, Burden of Proof in Eyual Protec- 
tion Discriminatory Impact Cases: An Emerging Standard, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 815, 817- 
1038 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I978 
Washington v. Davis is the first of a line of cases in which 
the Court has attempted to reinforce the primacy of discrimina- 
tory intent in race discrimination law without saddling the plain- 
tiff with an unreasonable burden of proof in neutral factor cases. 
Davis involved a written personnel test administered by the Dis- 
trict of Columbia police department to prospective recruits in 
order to determine whether the applicants had acquired a cer- 
tain level of verbal skill. Although the district court found that a 
higher percentage of blacks failed the test than whites, it never- 
theless granted summary judgment for the defendants based on 
a finding that the percentage of black police recruits closely ap- 
proximated the population ratio of eligible blacks in the recruit- 
ing area." The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit reversed. Applying the Griggs rule, it noted that four 
times as many blacks as whites failed the test." The Supreme 
Court reversed the court of appeals and upheld the written test, 
declaring that "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be ra- 
cially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially dis- 
criminatory purpose. "" 
Justice White examined initially the central purpose of the 
equal protection claused9 and the prior Court cases construing the 
fourteenth amendment.50 "[at is untenable," he reasoned, "that 
21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Burden of Proofl; Note, Discriminatory Purpose: What It 
Means CJnder the Equal Protection Clause-Washington v. Davis, 26 DE PAUL . REV. 650, 
653-57 (1977); Splitting, supra note 38, a t  237-40. See also Wilson, A Second I'ook at 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of 
the Federal Courts, 58 VA. L. REV. 844, 847-51 (1972). 
Commenting on the broad application the lower courts had given to Griggs, Judge 
Lambros observed in Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (N.D. Ohio 1978): 
In retrospect and in light of Washington v. Davis . . . it is now apparent 
that the Federal courts, in their eagerness to redress some of the effects of a long 
history of racial discrimination in this country, had not made the necessary fine 
distinctions among claims brought under Title VII, under 42 U.S.C. 99 1981- 
1985, and/or under the equal protection clause. 
45. Washington o. Davis was decided on June 7, 1976. In footnote 12 of that opinion, 
Justice White noted the Court's disagreement with some 18 cases dealing with employ- 
ment discrimination, urban renewal, zoning, public housing, and municipal services that 
had improperly applied the disproportionate impact standard. 426 U.S. a t  244 n.12. Sev- 
eral of these cases were brought under 19th-century civil rights statutes. E.g., Bridgeport 
Guardians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 
1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 
F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Arnold v. Ballard, 390 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ohio 1975). 
46. Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15,16 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975), reu'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
47. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975), reo'd, 426 U.S. 229 
( 1976). 
48. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). 
49. Id. a t  239. 
50. Id. at 239-45. 
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the Constitution prevents the Government from seeking modestly 
to upgrade the communicative abilities of its employees . . . . "51 
Justice White also examined the scope of the fourteenth amend- 
ment and the "consequences [that] would perhaps be likely to 
follow" if a disproportionate impact theory were to be applied.52 
He observed that title VII analysis "involves a more probing judi- 
cial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts 
of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the 
Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory 
purpose, is claimed."53 
The practical effect of the Supreme Court decisions following 
Davis has been to narrow the gap between the discriminatory 
intent and disproportionate impact theories by liberalizing the 
probative value of various kinds of circumstantial evidence rele- 
vant in an inquiry into motive." Nevertheless, there remains a 
crucial distinction between the impact and purpose theories in 
neutral factor cases: under the first a plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case by simply showing a racially disproportionate impact; 
under the second the plaintiff must show something more than 
mere statistical disparity. The added burden under the purpose 
theory will vary according to the facts of the case. If the plaintiff 
establishes extreme disproportionate impact, additional evidence 
of discrimination may be unne~essary.~"n other cases, however, 
the plaintiff may be required to produce evidence relating to the 
circumstances of the decision, the statements or conduct of the 
decisi~nmaker,~~ or the relative weight given various factors in 
making the decision in order to establish a prima facie caseaS7 
51. Id. at 245-46. 
52. Id. at 248. 
53. Id. at 247. 
54. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Arlington Heights outlines 
the kinds of evidence that can be used to establish discriminatory purpose. 429 U.S. a t  
265-68. See also Burden of Proof, supra note 44, a t  823-24 & n.50 (proof of intent does not 
pose an impossible obstacle). 
55. Justice White was careful not to exclude the possibility of using evidence of 
disproportionate impact to show discriminatory purpose. "Necessarily, an invidious dis- 
criminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including 
the fact . . . that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. It is also not 
infrequently true that the discriminatory impact . . . may for all practical purposes 
demonstrate unconstitutionality . . . ." Washington v. Davis, 426 U S .  at 242. See also 
id. a t  253-54 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
56. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265-68 (1977). 
57. Id. at 270. See Mt. Healthy City School Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977). See generally Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of 
('onstitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36, 105-14 (1977); Schwemm, supra note 
15. a t  1000-48. 
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Washington v. Davis' decisive limitation on the scope of the 
impact theory in constitutional cases has generated considerable 
confusion as to the standards that should be applied in section 
1981 and 1982 causes of action. Some courts have adopted the 
Davis standard without discussing any of the underlying issues? 
Other courts have analyzed the statute in light of Davis and 
concluded that section 1981 causes of action require proof of dis- 
criminatory intent, noting the linguistic and historical similari- 
ties between the Reconstruction statute and the fourteenth 
amendment on the one hand and the dissimilarities between sec- 
tion 1981 and title VII on the other? Still other courts have 
concluded, however, that "the burden of proving intentional or 
purposeful discrimination required under a constitutional claim 
is not required" under section 1981, a "statutory claim."" Certain 
commentators point to dicta in Davis that would appear to sup- 
port this po~ition.~' The most sensible view, in light of all of the 
58. E.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 79 F.R.D. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (relief denied 
because no proof of intent as required by Davis and Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)); Bacica v. Board of Educ., 451 F. 
Supp. 882 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (termination of seniority status purposeful, therefore plaintiffs 
entitled to recover under $6 1981 and 1983; cited Davis); Williams v. Ryan, 78 F.R.D. 364, 
367 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (Davis "held that in suits brought under the 'Reconstruction Era' civil 
rights acts, 42 U.S.C. $ 6  1981 and 1983, plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that a 
challenged employment practice is the result of an intent to discriminate"); Manica v. 
Chrysler Corp., 83 Lab. Cas. 17,861 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (in the wake of Davis, "the courts 
have clearly held that a 6 1981 cause of action does not arise merely upon a showing of 
disparate impact"); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 526, 534 
(S.D.N.Y .), (since Davis requires intent, "[ilt follows that sections 1981 and 1983 require 
the same showing") vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1977); Veizaga v. Na- 
tional Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6878,6881 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (citing 
Davis, (j 1981 claim dismissed for failure to allege discriminatory purpose). See also Pettit 
v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282,284,291-94 (D. Md. 1977) (dismissing action brought under 
$$ 1981 and 1983 because no intentional discrimination was found); Oritz v. Bach, 14 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019 (D. Colo. 1977) (equating 6 1981 with constitutional cause of 
action). 
59. E.g., Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949 (D. Md. 1977); Croker v. Boeing Co., 437 F. Supp. 1138, 
1181-82 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
60. Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F. Supp. 133,140 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (indicating the Griggs' 
standards are applicable to 6 1981). See also Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 
14 Empl. Prac. Dec. 4713, 4714-15 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (following Davis v. County of Los 
Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553)); 
Woods v. City of Saginaw, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 5988, 5990 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (Davis 
"refers only to constitutional claims"). 
61. Splitting, supra note 38, at 227, 231, 242 n.92, 247-49; 11 RICH. L. REV. 209, 218 
& n.60 (1976). These commentators argue that Davis indicates title VII standards are 
applicable in (j 1981 causes of action. But see Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1027- 
28 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949,963 n.11 (D. Md. 
1977). 
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confusion, is that Davis did not unambiguously resolve the 
issue.62 
One of the most recent discussions of the intent issue occurs 
in Davis u. County of Los A n g e l e ~ . ~ ~  The dispute in that case 
involved two written examinations administered in August 1969 
and January 1972 by the Los Angeles County Fire Department 
pursuant to its procedures for screening applicants for entry-level 
fireman positions.64 Plaintiffs, on behalf of all present and future 
black and Mexican-American applicants, challenged the tests 
and the department's five-foot seven-inch height requirement. 
The United States district court upheld the minimum height 
standard but found that both qualification tests had a discrimi- 
natory impact on minority applicants? Because the court found 
Justice Stevens noted the difficulty of applying title VII standards to other statutory 
schemes: 
In a general way [title W] standards shed light on the issues, but there is 
sufficient individuality and complexity to that statute, and to the regulations 
promulgated under it, to make it inappropriate simply to transplant those stan- 
dards in their entirety into a different statutory scheme having a different his- 
tory. 
Washington v. Davis, 426 US.  at  255 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
62. Some lower courts and commentators have taken this view. See, e.g., Davis v. 
County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1339-40, 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. 
Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553); Comment, Washington v. Davis: Reassessing the Bars to 
Employment Discrimination, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 747, 748 n.15 (1977). 
63. 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553). 
64. Judge Wallace explained the pre-1971 hiring procedure as follows: 
The process began with the written test and a physical agility test and the top 
scorers were then selected for oral interviews. A total score was given each 
applicant, with the discriminatory written test having a 35 percent weighted 
value. The highest ranking candidates were certified for placement on the eligi- 
bility list from which vacancies were filled. When the list was exhausted, which 
usually happened in about two years, a new examination process would begin 
in order to produce a new eligibility list. 
Id. a t  1345 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
The procedure was changed in 1971. A new written test was developed in an attempt 
to eliminate cultural bias, and the examination was not used as a ranking device but was 
graded on a pass-fail basis. Ninety-seven percent of the applicants passed the written 
exam. The department proposed that 500 of the passing applicants be selected at  random 
for interviews (giving every applicant who passed the exam an equal chance to be chosen 
for an oral interview), but was enjoined from so doing because of county and civil service 
regulations requiring that selections be made on merit. In response to this ruling, an 
abortive attempt was made to utilize an interview list consisting of the top 544 scorers on 
the written exam, of which 492 were white (representing 25.8% of the white applicants), 
10 black (representing 5.1% of the black applicants), and 33 Mexican-American. Finally, 
one year after taking the examination and 18 months after applying, all passing applicants 
were interviewed and an eligibility list was certified. Id. a t  1337 (majority opinion); id. a t  
1345-46 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. a t  1337 (majority opinion). For a summary of the relevant statistics, see id. ; 
id. a t  1346 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
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that use of the two tests violated both section 1981 and title VII 
and because of the department's "bad reputation as an employer 
in the minority c~mmuni ty , "~~  the court ordered accelerated hir- 
ing in the ratio of one black and one Mexican-American for every 
three whites hired until the effects of past discrimination had 
been eliminated. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 
after granting a rehearing67 to consider the impact of Washington 
u. Davis, upheld the district court's determination that the 1972 
written examination violated section 1981 because of its dispro- 
portionate effect upon minority applicants and reversed the judg- 
ment approving the five-foot seven-inch limitation. However, the 
circuit court held that the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge 
the 1969 examination. The majority expressed reluctance to 
apply the discriminatory purpose standard because of its belief 
that further limitations on the impact rule would "produce unde- 
sirable substantive law conflicts" and "would dilute what has 
been a potent remedy for the ills of countless minority employ- 
ees. "W 
Judge Wallace dissented. After an extensive analysis of the 
legal issues, he concluded that "the legislative history of section 
1982 indicates that it should track the Fourteenth Amendment's 
standards of proof."" In Judge Wallace's view, practical reasons 
necessitate a stricter standard in section 1981 cases. A require- 
ment of discriminatory intent, like the administrative prerequis- 
ites under title VII, serves to screen out frivolous claims. Further- 
more, divorcing section 1981 from the stricter constitutional stan- 
dard motivates plaintiffs to proceed under the statute, thus un- 
dermining the efficacy of the fourteenth amendment. Finally, 
because of the broad scope of section 1981, any decrease in the 
burden of proof necessary to make the out a racial discrimination 
claim " 'should await legislative prescription.' "70 
66. Id. at  1336 (majority opinion). Of the department's 1,762 firemen, about 53 (3%) 
were Mexican-American and 9 (0.5%) were black a t  the time of the district court judg- 
ment. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari a t  6 n.1, County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 98 S. 
Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553). The trial court found that 10.8% of the population of Los 
Angeles County was black and 18.3% was Mexican-American. 566 F.2d a t  1345 & n.1 
(Wallace, J., dissenting). 
67. The Ninth Circuit entered its original opinion in the case on Oct. 20, 1976. Davis 
v .  County of Los Angeles, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas, 1217 (9th Cir. 1976), withdrawn and 
new opinion announced, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S .  Ct. 3087 (1978) 
(No. 77-1553). 
68. 566 F.2d a t  1340. 
69. Id. at  1348 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
70. Id. at  1350-51 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. a t  248). 
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Although none have done so as exhaustively as the Ninth 
Circuit, most of the other circuits have addressed the issue. Three 
circuits seem to agree that proof of discriminatory purpose is not 
necessary in actions brought under section 1981,71 while five cir- 
cuits have indicated that the burden of proof in section 1981 
causes of action is equivalent to the burden in constitutional 
IV. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS OF 1866 
AND 1870-IMPACT OR PURPOSE? 
Discussion of the evidentiary standard applicable to sections 
1981 and 1982 can be divided into five areas: the implications of 
prior Supreme Court decisions, the in pari materia rule, legisla- 
tive intent, the relevance of the broad scope of the Reconstruction 
Acts, and the impact the choice of standards will have on the role 
of the judiciary. 
A. The Supreme Court Precedents 
In a line of cases that has engendered considerable discus- 
-- - - - - - - - - - 
71. See Davis v. county Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), eert. granted. 
98 S. Ct. 3087 (1978) (No. 77-1553); Kinsey v. First Regional Secs., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.22 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (dicta in footnote indicating that title VII and 6 1981 do not impose the 
same burden of proof as the Constitution). 
The Fourth Circuit has read title Vn standards dealing with seniority systems into 
4 1981. Johnson v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), petition for eert. 
filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. July 31, 1978) (No. 78-179). Arguably, the reasoning of the 
court could be extended to justify the adoption of title VII evidentiary standards in 
4 1981 causes of action. 
72. See Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2 (5th Cir. 1978) (adopting constitu- 
tional evidentiary standards for 6 1981 causes of action); Donne11 v. General Motors Corp., 
576 F.2d 1292, 1300 (8th Cir. 1978) (6 1981 involves different standards of proof than title 
VII); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978) (6 1981 claims follow constitu- 
tional rather than title VII evidentiary standards); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 
F.2d 126, 140 (3d Cir. 1977) (implying that burdens of proof under 6 1981 are the same as 
under the Constitution), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1457 (1978); Chicano Police Officers Ass'n 
v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1977) (prior holding that the measure of a claim under 
Ei 1981 is essentially the same as that applied under title VII acknowledged as contrary to 
Washington u. Davis); Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1976) (because no 
constitutional claim was established, no 4 1981 claim could be made out; constitutional 
claim was dismissed because plaintiff failed to allege intentional discrimination). Cf. 
Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 921, 912 (3d Cir. 1978) (in enacting title 
VII, the 88th Congress did not intend "to circumscribe the remedial powers of the federal 
courts under 64 1981, 1983,1985, and 1988"). Rut cf. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe 
Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1191 n.37 (5th Cir. 1978) (title VII protection of bona fide seniority 
system should apply in cases brought under 6 1981; court agrees with Johnson v. Ryder 
Truck Lines, Inc., 575 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3153 (US.  
July 31, 1978) (No. 78-179); interestingly, Pettway was decided several months before 
Williams u. DeKalb County). 
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~ i o n , ? ~  the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870 prohibit "racial discrimination in 
the making and enforcement of private  contract^."^^ In Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer CO.,'~ the Court held that " 5 1982 bars all racial 
discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of 
property."76 In addition, the Court stated, the 1866 Act "was 
meant to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the rights 
enumerated in the statute,"" implying that section 1982 does not 
extend to nonracially motivated practices that nevertheless dis- 
criminate in fact. Language in other opinions also suggests that 
section 1981 prohibits only racially motivated refusals to make 
and enforce  contract^.'^ These pronouncements must be regarded 
as dicta, however, because in none of the cases was the question 
of motivation at issue; all involved blatant discriminatory prac- 
tices. While Washington v. Davis involved a facially neutral prac- 
tice that operated discriminatorily, the case did not resolve the 
intent issue under the Reconstruction statutes.7g The Supreme 
Court cases, then, do not explicitly decide the question of which 
evidentiary standard is applicable to sections 1981 and 1982. 
73. See note 8 supra. See also Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of 
the Thirteenth Amendment (chs. I-VIII), 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1,331, 357, 593, 610,844,871, 
1070 (1974- 1975). 
74. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 & n:S (1976). 
75. 392 U S .  409 (1968). 
76. Id. a t  413 (emphasis in original). 
77. Id. at  426 (emphasis added; emphasis on "all" deleted). See also id. a t  420 n.25 
(issue in Jones involves "an actual refusal to sell to a Negro" (emphasis in original)); id. 
a t  421-22 ((j 1982 "encompass[es] every racially motivated refusal to sell or rent"); id. 
a t  449 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court's holding that "respondents' ra- 
cially motivated refusal to sell [petitioners] a house entitles them to judicial relief '). 
78. In Runyon v. McCrary, the Court, while discussing the Act of 1866, stated: 
Just as in Jones a Negro's 5 1 right to purchase property on equal terms with 
whites was violated when a private person refused to sell to the prospective 
purchaser solely because he was a Negro, so also a Negro's 8 1 right to "make 
and enforce contracts" is violated if a private offeror refuses to extend to a 
Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts 
as he extends to white offerees. 
427 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1976) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See also McDonald v. 
Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 US. 273,288 (1976) 5 1981 prohibits racial discrimination 
in the making and enforcement of contracts); Runyan v. McCrary, 427 U.S. a t  192 (White, 
.J., dissenting) ("We are urged here to extend the meaning and reach of 42 U.S.C. Q 1981 
so as to establish a general prohibition against a private individual's or institution's 
refusing to enter into a contract with another person because of that person's race."); id. 
a t  192 passim (White, J., dissenting) ($ 1981 does not prohibit private racially motivated 
refusals to contract); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 235-37 (1969) 
("[rlespondents' actions in refusing to approve the assignment of [Sullivan'sl member- 
ship share [because Freeman was black] was clearly an interference with Freeman's right 
to 'lease"' under Q 1982). 
79. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra. 
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B. The In Pari Materia Rule 
The argument has been made that since the Court has de- 
clared that title VII and section 1981 "embrace 'parallel or over- 
lapping remedies against discrimination,' "no the two statutes are 
in pari materia and should be construed togetherY According to 
Sutherland, "[sltatutes are considered to be in pari materia-to 
pertain to the same subject matter when they relate to the . . . 
same class of persons or things, or have the same purpose or 
object."n2 If two statutes are found to be in pari materia, the later 
statute governs the construction of the earlier ena~tment .~"  
Therefore, the argument goes, since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits practices that result in disproportionate  effect^,^' the 
same standard should apply to the earlier Civil Rights Acts. 
The in pari materia rule is not applicable in the case of the 
Reconstruction statutes, however, because title VII and section 1981 
do not relate to the "same class of persons or things," nor do they 
have the "same purpose or object." Even were title VII to extend to 
all employment relationships, which it does it would not begin 
to reach the conduct potentially within the scope of section 1981. 
The Supreme Court in Johnson u. Railway Express AgencyuR took 
great pains to point out that there are significant substantive and 
procedural differences between the two statutes;n7 they provide 
"separate, distinct, and independent" remedies.nn Likewise, the fact 
that the two Acts generally seek to eliminate racial discrimination 
does not imply that they have the same "purpose or object." As 
- - 
80. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t  1340 (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)). 
81. Disproportionate Impact, supra note 8, a t  1286-87 & n.116-17. 
82. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 4 51.03, a t  298 (4th 
ed. C. Sands ed. 1973) (footnote omitted). See also id. 4 49.11. 
83. Id. 4 51.03, a t  300. 
84. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
85. See note 9 supra. 
86. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). 
87. Id. a t  457-61. Compare Brown, Handling a Case from Inception to Trial, in EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY  COMPLIANCE,^^^^, a t  105, 105-41 (title VII procedures) with 3 
A. LARSON, supra note 35, $8 90.00-.50 ( 4  1981 procedures). 
88. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. a t  461. The Supreme Court has 
similarly pointed to 
the vast differences between, on the one hand, a general statute [section 19821 
appliable only to racial discrimination in the rental and sale of property and 
enforceable only by private acting on their own initiative, and, on the other 
hand, a detailed housing law [title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 19681, applic- 
able to a broad range of discriminatory practices and enforceable by a complete 
arsenal of federal authority. 
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 417 (1968). 
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Judge Wallace explained, "[tlhat both statutes can apply to the 
same facts and that both may afford similar remedies is beside the 
point. The same can be said of title VII and the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment, yet, after Washington v.  Davis, their remains an essential 
'operational distinction' between them. "" 
Similarly, the fact tha t  employment discrimination cases 
brought under title VII involves one evidentiaiy theory does not 
necessitate the application of the same theory in employment cases 
brought under section 1981. As Judge Wisdom observed in a similar 
context, "[dlifferent treatment of similar legislative and constitu- 
tional provisions" has already become a reality in discrimination 
law? Reliance on the in pari materia rule, therefore, does not re- 
solve the question of the appropriate evidentiary standard for causes 
of action under sections 1981 and 1982. 
C. The Inquiry into Congressional Intent 
I t  is well settled that the intent of the legislature is the pri- 
mary test in statutory interpretation." According to Sutherland, 
"The reason for this doubtless lies in an assumption that an obli- 
gation to construe statutes in such a way as to carry out the will 
. . . of the lawmaking branch of the government is mandated by 
principles of separation of powers."g2 
89. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d at  1348 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
90. Nevett v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 237 n.8 (5th Cir.)(Wisdom, J., specially concur- 
ring), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3283 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1978) (No. 78-492). In the 
same footnote, Judge Wisdom added: 
While Washington v. Davis found that an intent test applied to an employment 
discrimination claim brought under the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment, it specifically reaffirmed that such an intent was not necessary 
under Title VII [citations omitted]. Similarly, although the Court struck down 
the equal protection challenge to the zoning laws of Arlington Heights, it re- 
manded the case for consideration of the statutory issues. On remand, the Court 
of Appeals held that a violation of Title VIII could be made out without proof 
of a discriminatory intent. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village 
of Arlington Heights, 7 Cir. 1977, 558 F.2d 1283. Accord, United States v. City 
of Black Jack, 8 Cir. 1974, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85. 
Id. 
91. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 82, Q 45.05, a t  15. 
92. Id. Chief Justice Burger has recently emphasized the primacy of congressional 
intention in interpreting legislative policies: 
Our system of government is, after all, a tripartite one, with each Branch having 
certain defined functions delegated to it by the Constitution. While "[it! is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to  say what the 
law is," Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 . . . (1803), it is equally-and 
emphatically-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate 
legislative policies, mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their 
relative priority for the Nation. 
Tennessee Valley ~ ~ t h .  v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2301 (1978). 
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1. The original intention 
Because of the controversy aroused by the extension of the 
Reconstruction statutes to cover. private conduct, commentators 
have examined extensively the legislative history of sections 1981 
and 1982 in an attempt to discern the intention of the Thirty- 
Ninth C o n g r e s ~ . ~ ~  The Supreme Court concluded in Runyon v.  
McCrary that section 1981 derives both from the thirteenth and 
the fourteenth amendmenbg4 Judge Wallace, dissenting in Davis 
v.  County of Los Angeles, indicated that because 
section 1981 enjoys a unique historical and conceptual relation- 
ship to the Fourteenth Amendment which is not shared by Title 
VII . . ., it is quite proper to assume . . . that the standards for 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under section 
1981 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment should be the same: there must be proof of discriminatory 
intentsg5 
A categorical denial by the Court of the historical relation- 
ship between section 1981 and fourteenth amendment would not 
necessarily require a different result. The fact that the Thirty: 
Ninth Congress intended the fourteenth amendment to proscribe 
only racially motivated conduc tg~mpl ies  that the thirteenth 
93. One of the most authoritative treatments of the history of the Civil Rights Acts 
of 1866 and 1870 is found in 6 C. FAIRMAN, supra note 22, at 1163-206. See also J. TENBROEK, 
EQUAL UNDER LAW 174-97 (rev. ed. 1965); Greenfield & Kates, supra note 9, a t  662-64; 
Gressman, The IJnhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952); 
Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement 
Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 466-91 (1974); 
Disproportionate Impact, supra note 8, a t  1275-80; Private Discriminations, supra note 8, 
at 617-21; Racial Discrimination in Employment, supra note 8, at 617-21. 
94. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). The Court found Ei 1981 "to be drawn from both Ei 16 of the 
1870 Act and Ji 1 of the 1866 Act." Id. a t  160, 168 n.8. The 1870 Act was a fourteenth 
amendment statute, and the 1866 Act was a thirteenth amendment statute. Id. a t  205 
(White, J., dissenting). For a thorough analysis of the relationship between the 1866 Civil 
Rights Act and the fourteenth amendment, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 22-
36, 38-40, 46, 48, 140-273 (1977). See generally Bickel, The Original IJnderstanding and 
the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955). 
According to Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), Ei 1982 was derived 
from the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Id. a t  422. 
95. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t  1349 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (foot- 
note omitted). 
96. It has been suggested that the discriminatory purpose standard for constitutional 
causes of action in Washington v.  Davis was not required by the text of the fourteenth 
amendment, "but was simply a matter of the court's discretion." Proof of Purpose, supra 
note 2, a t  739 & n.73. "In [Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 
429 U.S. 252 (1977)], on the other hand, the Court seemed concerned that the adoption 
of a discriminatory effect standard would not show proper deference to the constitutional 
functions of the legislature and the executive, by involving the courts in reviewing the 
merits of political decisions." Id. a t  744. 
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amendment carries a similar pros~r ip t ion.~~ The historical con- 
text and the debates of the Thirty-Ninth Congress clearly indi- 
cate that the framers of the Reconstruction amendments and 
Enforcement Acts, in the massive undertaking of granting the 
newly emancipated blacks practical freedom, intended that the 
guarantee of fundamental rights outlaw only illicitly motivated 
forms of d iscr iminat i~n.~~ 
2. Implied modification 
A stronger argument for a legislatively mandated impact 
standard could be made by showing that Congress modified the 
traditional purpose standard when it passed the Equal Employ- 
ment Opportunity Act in 1972." With respect to the 1972 Act, the 
Supreme Court commented in Runyon v. McCrary: "Congress 
. . . specifically considered and rejected an amendment that 
would have repealed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as interpreted 
- - 
97. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d a t  1349 n.8 (Wallace, J., dissenting) 
(Wallace believes that  "discriminatory intent is required in Thirteenth Amendment 
cases"). 
98. Professor Beger notes: 
While most men were united in a desire to protect the freedmen from outrage 
and oppression in the South by prohibiting discrimination with respect to 
"fundamental rights," without which freedom was illusory, to go beyond this 
with a campaign for political and social equality was, as Senator James R. 
Doolittle of Wisconsin confessed, "frightening" to the Republicans who 
"represented States containing the despised and feared free negroes." 
R. BERGER, supra note 94, a t  15 (footnote omitted) (quoting D. DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER 
AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 158 (1970)). 
In an extensive analysis of the Q$ 1981 and 1982 intent issue, one commentator 
concludes: 
Even if it is accepted that the legislative history of the two Acts supports the 
Supreme Court's view that these laws were intended to regulate private behav- 
ior, it cannot seriously be argued that that legislative history also supports the 
contention that Congress meant these laws to outlaw any conduct with unin- 
tended racially disproportionate effects upon contracts. A reading of the rele- 
vant congressional debates reveals absolutely nothing that would lend credence 
to such a notion. On the contrary, these sources give every indication that these 
laws were intended only to outlaw those actions undertaken with invidious, 
discriminatory motivation. 
I)isproportionate Impact, supra note 8, a t  1280 (footnotes omitted). 
The courts have held that certain other Reconstruction civil rights statutes require 
proof of discriminatory intent. Actions brought under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 (1976), for exam- 
ple, require proof of discriminatory intent. E-g., Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 
1086-87 (8th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949,963-65 (D. Md. 
1977). 42 U.S.C. 8 1985(3) (1976) also requires proof of discriminatory intent. Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 96-102 (1971). Both $ 1983 and 8 1985(3) were enacted as part 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, $ 4  1-2, 17 Stat. 13. 
99. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 111 (1972) (codified a t  42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 to -17 
(1976)). 
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by this Court in Jones . . . . There could hardly be a clearer 
indication of congressional agreement with the view that # 1981 
does reach private acts of racial d i sc r imina t i~n . "~~~  Congressional 
endorsement of the view that sections 1981 and 1982 reach private 
acts of discrimination, however, does not necessarily imply that 
Congress also assented to the application of a disproportionate 
impact standard in cases brought under the early statutes. The 
history of the proposed 1972 amendment does not indicate that 
Congress intentionally or tacitly acquiesced to a modification of 
the traditional burden of proof in actions brought under the Re- 
construction Acts.'"' Since it seems doubtful that Congress in- 
tended to modify the evidentiary principles historically appicable 
to the nineteenth-century Civil Rights Acts, the original intention 
should govern. Io2 
100. 427 U.S. a t  174-75 (emphasis in original). See also id. a t  174 n.11. 
101. Congressional debate on the Equal Opportunity Act came a t  a time when the 
courts were expanding application of the Griggs rule to § 1981 employment cases. See, 
e . g ,  Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325-26 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U S .  950 
(1972). Congress recognized the potential impact of the Griggs standard on civil rights law. 
See, e . g ,  118 CONG. REC. 3371 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id. a t  4925-26 (remarks 
of Sen. Allen); 117 CONG. REC. 31961 (1971) (bill introduced that would have altered 
language of title VII to reflect Griggs rule) (remarks of Rep. Perkins); H.R. REP. NO. 238, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 20-22 (1971); S. REP. NO. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1971). 
In debating legislation that would have made title VII the exclusive employment 
discrimination remedy, Senators pointed to the differences between the 1866 and 1871 
statutes and title VII. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 3370 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (statute of 
limitations for 19th-century statutes differs from limitation period under 1964 Act); id. 
a t  3960 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); i d .  a t  3961-62 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (1866 statute, 
unlike title VII, reaches third parties guilty of discrimination). 
In his final argument against making title VII the exclusive employment discrimina- 
tion remedy, Senator Williams described the distinctive nature of 19th-century civil rights 
law: 
Two of the basic statutes that have guided this country for a century would 
be wiped out, in substantial part, by this amendment. . . . [citing Q 19811 
For 100 years, there has been built a body of law dealing with the rights of 
individuals . . . . 
The statute I have quoted was followed up, in 1871, by another provision. 
These are basic laws from which . . . developed a body of law that should be 
preserved and not wiped out. 
Id. a t  3963-64. The "body of law" referred to by Senator Williams consisted of the court 
opinions construing the Reconstruction civil rights legislation. These cases had almost 
exclusively applied a discriminatory intent standard. I t  seems clear, then, that although 
Congressmen and Senators were conscious of the Griggs standard, they did not intend to 
disturb the court precedents dealing with §§  1981 and 1982. 
102. It might also be argued that Congress impliedly repealed 4 1981's traditional 
purpose requirement when it enacted title VII in 1964. This argument is unpersuasive. 
Several commentators have expressed the view that title VII, as originally envisioned, was 
intended to proscribe only illicitly motivated conduct. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra 
note 24, a t  1, 15, Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of I S # ,  84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1113-18 (1971). The issue was not 
definitively settled until Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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3. Purpose of the ninteenth-century Civil Rights Acts: Equal 
treatment or equal status? 
For many, the fact that the framers of the Reconstruction 
legislation intended to prohibit only conduct that can be shown 
to be illicitly motivated would not be determinative of the burden 
of proof issue.IoB The view that present-day policy should control 
questions of constitutional or statutory construction is widely 
held.lo4 Unless the courts intend to completely abrogate the. prin- 
ciple of separation of powers, however,I0"hey must defer to indi- 
The Supreme Court has on several occasions emphasized that title VII and 8 1981 
are independent. For example, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 
(1975), the Court noted the congressional finding "'that the two procedures augment each 
other and are not mutually exclusive.' H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971). See also S. Rep. 
No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971)." Id. at 459. The Court noted "the independence of the avenues 
of relief respectively available under Title VII and the older 9 1981," id. a t  460, concluding 
"that the remedies available under Title VII and under Q 1981, although related, and 
although directed to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent." Id. 
at  461. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), the Court stated that "the 
legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to 
pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and 
federal statutes." Id. a t  48 (footnote omitted). See generally id. at  47, 48 n.9, 49-54. 
Similarly, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court identified 
the significant differences between title VIII and 4 1982, endorsing the view expressed by 
Representative Kelly of New York "'that the scope [of 4 19821 was somewhat different 
[than title VIII], the remedies and procedures were different, and still the new law was 
. . . quite necessary."' Id. at  416 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 2807 (1968)) (footnote omitted). 
"The Civil Rights Act of 1968 does not mention 42 U.S.C. Q 1982, and we cannot assume 
that Congress intended to effect any change, either substantive or procedural, in the prior 
statute." Id. at 416 n.20 (emphasis added). 
103. One commentator has argued that "[tlhe Supreme Court's deemphasis of legis- 
lative history as a guide to specific contemporary applications of Reconstruction era civil 
rights legislation is not without precedent." Expanding Scope, supra note 8, a t  420. 
Construing Q 1981 "in accordance with contemporary mores seems necessary if the law is 
to remain responsive to evolving social values." Id. See, e.g., Promise of Equality, supra 
note 13, a t  324 ("the language of the impassioned Reconstruction Era congressional de- 
bates is of limited value today" (footnote omitted)). 
104. See generally, A. BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWER (1967); C. BLACK, THE 
PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960); Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: 
Some Interventions Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968). 
Professor Blumrosen, commenting on the Supreme Court's "sensitive, liberal inter- 
pretation of Title VII" in Griggs, observed that "[a] judge may feel more comfortable in 
rendering a liberal interpretation of a statute than in interpreting the Constitution since 
a decision based on the Constitution is less easily revised." Blumrosen, supra note 36, a t  
63. 
105. Professor Berger contends that when Chief Justice Warren declared that "'we 
cannot turn back the clock to 1868,' he in fact rejected the framers' intention as irrele- 
vant." According to Berger, "[sluch conduct impels one to conclude that the Justices 
are become a law unto themselves." R. BERCER, supra note 94, a t  408 & n.5 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954)). See generally D. 
Ho~owrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 12-21 (1977); Speech by Philip B. Kurland, 
Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference (April 26, 1978). 
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cations of legislative purpose-if not expressly stated, then im- 
plicitly derived from the principles or policies embodied in legis- 
lative ena~trnents. '~~ 
Commentators have identified two basic values that under- 
gird all civil rights legislation: equal treatment and equal sta- 
tus.Io7 Equal treatment, in its most restrictive form, "would pro- 
hibit race-conscious decisionmaking in all circumstances," or, 
liberally defined, "would permit and in some circumstances re- 
quire race-conscious decisionmaking as a remedy for the effects 
of past de jure discrimination by the same decisionmaker, but 
would prohibit it in all other  situation^."^^^ Equal status, on the 
other hand, "is concerned with remedying inequalities of politi- 
cal, social, and economic status. This approach would require 
. . . decisionmakers always to consider race . . . . w 109 
Each principal evidentiary theory embodies one of these val- 
ues. The discriminatory purpose theory promotes the value of 
equal treatment by conditioning the plaintiff's right to prevail on 
proof that the defendant's act was prompted by an improper 
motive. The plaintiff is not favored by a presumption of a general- 
ized injury originating at some distant place and time. The dis- 
proportionate impact theory, on the other hand, compensates 
victims of past societal discrimination by easing the burden of 
proof. It promotes the value of equal status by allowing the plain- 
tiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination without refer- 
ence to the defendant's good or bad intentions."" 
Which value did the Thirty-Ninth Congress intend to imple- 
ment under the Acts of 1866 and 1870? Section 1 of the Act of 1866 
(from which both sections 1981 and 1982 were derived)"' provided 
[tlhat all persons [considered citizens of the United States] 
of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition 
of slavery or involuntary servitude . . . shall have the same 
106. See 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 82, # 45.09, a t  30. 
107. This Comment uses "equal treatment" and "equal status" consistently with the 
discussion of Professor Fiss in Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY 
& PUB. APP. 107 (1976). See also Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t  727-28 & n.21. Commen- 
tators have relied on the text and history of the Constitution and the Civil Rights Acts 
both to support and refute arguments for the adoption of one or the other principle as the 
dominant equal protection value. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 1, a t  1, 5; Fiss, supra at 
118-19 & n.16, 147 & n.63. See generally Tussman & tenBmek, The Equal Protection of 
the I,aws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). 
108. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 728 (footnotes omitted). 
109. Id. a t  728. 
110. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t  728-29 & n.24. ("the Court has responded t o  
the problem of equal status by using evidentiary presumptions to aid a plaintiff in his 
proof of racial discrimination"). 
1 1 1. See note 94 supra. 
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right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make 
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed- 
ings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by 
white citizens . . . . 112 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the Thirty-Ninth Con- 
gress intended that the 1866 Act apply equally to whites as well 
as nonwhites. In McDonald u. Santa Fe Trail Transportation 
Co., 11:' Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, began his analy- 
sis of section 1981 by examining the language quoted above, not- 
ing that it "explicitly applies to 'all persons' . . . including white 
persons."114 Turning to the legislative history, Justice Marshall 
relied on comments made during the Senate debates such as the 
following: " '[The bill] simply gives to persons who are of differ- 
ent races or colors the same civil rights' . . . '[Tlhe white as well 
as the black is included in this first section' . . . '[The bill] 
provides, in the first place, that the civil rights of all men, without 
regard to color, shall be equal . . . . ' "115 
In response to Senator Davis' objection that section 2 of the 
Act extended to blacks a protection never given to whites, Sena- 
tor Trumball, one of the bill's sponsors, stated: 
"Sir, this bill applies to white m e n  as well as black men. I t  
declares that all persons in the United States shall be entitled 
to the same civil rights, the right to the fruit of their own 
labor. . . . [Tlhe only object of [the bill] is to secure equal 
rights to all the citizens of the country, [it is] a bill that pro- 
tects a white m a n  just as much  as a black rnan."l1" 
Senator Trumball expressly disavowed the idea that the bill 
" 'discriminates in favor of colored persons.' "I1' The Senators 
repeatedly affirmed that the races were to be treated equally; 
their rights before the law were to be the same.11x 
The House debates also clearly indicate that the value es- 
poused by the proponents of the bill was equal treatment and not 
112. Civil Rights Act of 1866, .ch. 31, Ej 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at U.S.C. $ 5  
1981-1982 (1970)). 
113. 427 US. 273 (1976). 
114. Id. at 287 (emphasis in original). 
115. Id. at 289 n.20 (citations omitted) (brackets in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504-05, 601 (1866) (remarks of Senators Howard, Johnson, and 
Henrick) ). 
116. Id. at 290 (emphasis in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 
(1866)). 
117. Id. at 295 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1758 (1866)). 
118. Id. at 288;289 n.20. 
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equal status. Referring to the bill, Representative Shallabarger 
declared: 
"Its whole effect is to require that whatever rights as to each of 
those enumerated civil . . . matters the states may confer upon 
one race or color of the citizens shall be held by all races in 
equality. Your State may deprive women of the right to sue or 
contract or testify, and children from doing the same. But if you 
do so, or do not so as to one race, you shall treat the other 
likewi~e."I~~ 
The values expressed in the legislative history of title VII as 
interpreted by GriggsIm contrast markedly with the expressed in- 
tentions of the nineteenth-century legislators. Fully aware of the 
disparate impact resulting from standardized tests, the Eighty- 
Eighth Congress intended to include within the scope of title VII 
the consequences as well as the motivations of employment prac- 
tices.I2' While the Reconstruction Acts and the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 were all broadly aimed a t  eradicating discrimination, they 
focused on different notions of equality. The historical origins of 
the 1866 and 1870 Acts indicate that sections 1981 and 1982, like 
the Constitution, are more circumscribed in their treatment of 
equality than title VII. 
D. Scope of the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts 
The broad coverage of the fourteenth amendment figured 
prominently in the Supreme Court's decision to require the appli- 
cation of the discriminatory purpose theory in constitutional 
causes of action. The Court noted that application of a dispropor- 
tionate impact theory to the equal protection clause "'would ren- 
der suspect each difference in treatment among the grant classes, 
however lacking the racial motivation and however otherwise ra- 
tional the treatment might be."qz2 Consequently, notes one com- 
mentator, "[d]ecisionmaken would be forced to compensate for 
underlying social inequalities that they did not create."123 
119. Id. at 293 n.23 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 (1866)). Repre- 
sentative Wilson also declared that the bill provided for the equality of all races in their 
civil rights and immunities. Id. at 292 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 
(1866)). See abo Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 740 n.74 (McDonald "held that Con- 
gress intended to enact the value of equal treatment"). 
120. 401 U.S. at 429-30, 434-36 & nn.10-11. 
121. Id. at 432. See Disproportionate Impact, supra note 8, at 1286 & nn.111-12. Rut 
see Seelman, supra note 40, at 10-69; Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 102-06 & n.29 (1974). 
122. Washington v. Davis, 426 U S .  at 241 (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 
535, 548 (1972)). 
123. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 738. 
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Similar results would likely follow if the disproportionate 
impact theory were applied to the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 
1870. Section 1981 and 1982 prohibitions against racial discrimi- 
nation extend significantly beyond the proscriptions of the Civil 
Rights Acts of the 1960 '~, l~~ and in some respects even outdistance 
constitutional ~rohibiti0ns.l~~ Courts have indicated that section 
1981, for example, reaches discrimination involving privately 
owned recreational facilities,126 medical care,127 private educa- 
tion,I2"abor union practices,129 libraries,130 franchising arrange- 
ments, 131 restaurants, 132 the professions, 133 religious practices, 134 
transportation services, 135 and voting. 1 3 ~  Blacks, whites, aliens, 
and Hispanics have standing under section 1981.137 In sum, the 
trend in recent Court decisions is to extend sections 1981 and 1982 
to an increasingly broad range of private associational and con- 
tractual re1ation~hips.l~~ As the Court recognized in Washington 
124. See Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d at  1347 (Wallace, J., dissenting) 
("The potential scope of section 1981 is exceptionally broad, going far beyond the Title 
VII realm of employment, and conceivably reaching virtually all private contractual ar- 
rangements"); note 9 supra. 
125. See Expanding Scope, supra note 8, a t  422. 
126. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973); Olzman v. 
Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949). 
127. United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969). 
128. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 
F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971). See generally 31 ARK. L. REV. 314, 323 n.59 (1977); 52 
WASH. L. REV. 955 (1977). 
129. E.g., Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 
F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
130. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 
721 (1945). 
131. Sud v. Import Motors Ltd., 379 F. Supp. 1064 (W.D. Mich. 1974). 
132. Hernandez v. Erlenbusch, 368 F. Supp. 752 (D. Or. 1973). 
133. Eaton v. Board of Managers of James Walker Memorial Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th 
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959). 
134. Central Presbyterian Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. 
Mo. 1969). 
135. Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1958). 
136. Smith v. Paris, 257 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ala. 1966), modified on other grounds, 
386 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1967). 
137. 3 A. LARSON, supra note 35, $4  71.10-.50. 
138. See note 8 supra. Justice White has discussed the problems associated with 
expanding the scope of $ 1981: 
As the associational or contractual relationships [to which $ 1981 applies] 
become more private, the pressures to hold 8 1981 inapplicable to them will 
increase. Imaginative judicial construction of the word "contract" .is foreseeable; 
Thirteenth Amendment limitations on Congress' power to ban "badges and 
incidents of slavery" may be discovered; the doctrine of the right to association 
may be bent to cover a given situation. 
Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. a t  212 (White, J., dissenting). 
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u. Davis, use of an impact standard in these gray areas would 
involve the judiciary in far-reaching decisions about a whole 
range of practices "that may be more burdensome to the poor and 
to the average black than to the more affluent white."13$ 
Some argue, however, that since the Civil Rights Acts are 
remedial in nature they should be liberally interpretedi4" "in 
order that their beneficent objectives may be realized to the full- 
est extent possible."'41 But unlike titles VI, VII, and VIII, which 
are subject to carefully circumscribed substantive and procedural 
limitations,'" sections 1981 and 1982 have no such restrictions. 
Because of the breadth of their application, sections 1981 and 
1982, a t  least as much as the Constitution, need the restraining 
effect of a discriminatory purpose standard.I4" 
E. Judicial or Legislative Resolution? 
Incident to the concerns associated with the scope of sections 
1981 and 1982 are the implications that application of the impact 
standard to the Reconstruction Acts would have on the role of the 
judiciary.'" In order to implement an impact standard in section 
1981 and 1982 cases, the judiciary would be called upon in the 
first place to "undertake the political task of trying to decide 
139. 426 U.S. at  248 (footnote omitted) (the Court had specific reference to the effects 
of applying an impact standard in constitutional cases). 
140. It has been argued that "because the 1866 Act is quasi-constitutional, its inter- 
pretation need not be limited by the intent of its framers." 52 WASH. L. REV. 955,961 n.23 
( 1977). 
141. 3 J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 82, § 72.05, a t  392 (footnote omitted). See Dispro- 
portionate Impact, supra note 8, a t  1284-86; Promise of Equality, supra note 13, at  326. 
In his opinion in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), Justice 
Brennan argued that decisions construing title VII and other civil rights statutes "are 
indicative of the Court's unwillingness to construe remedial statutes designed to eliminate 
discrimination against racial minorities in a manner which would impede efforts to obtain 
this objective." id. a t  2781 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting). 
142. See 42 U.S.C. $4 2000d to 2000f (1976); note 9 supra. 
As Judge Wallace pointed out in his dissent to Davis v.  County of Los Angeles, 
"[blecause these barriers [to title VII] tend to eliminate claims that are frivolous or 
suffering from obvious legal or factual. defects, it-is not unreasonable to provide that a 
prima facie case may be established without a showing of discriminatory intent." 566 F.2d 
at  1350 (Wallace, J., dissenting). 
143. Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d at  1350 (Wallace, J., dissenting): "The 
section 1981 screening mechanism, as in actions proceeding directly under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is the required demonstration of discriminatory intent." 
144. See Perry, supra note 39, a t  586-88 (implementation of disproportionate impact 
analysis depends on "conception of judicial function"); Burden of Proof, supra note 44, 
a t  834 (discusses "the Court's traditional reluctance to  interfere with the legislative and 
administrative process"); Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t  738-39 (Davis "was also 
concerned with defining the proper role of the judiciary"). 
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what . . . areas are appropriate ones" for the r ~ 1 e . I ~ ~  According 
to Justice Powell, this would involve a finding "that past discrim- 
ination [in that area] had handicapped various minority groups 
to such an extent that disparate impact could be traced to identi- 
fiable instances of past di~crimination?~~ 
The courts would then be required to define how the burden 
of proof will be allocated. Requiring the invalidation of any prac- 
tice that has a racially discriminatory effect under a pure impact 
standard would be theoretically possible. This approach, how- 
ever, 
would deeply involve the judiciary in political decisionmaking, 
transforming the courts into an instrument for the redistribu- 
tion of societal benefits and burdens between blacks and whites. 
Furthermore, the invalidation of such decisions would often be 
a remedy disproportionate to the decisionmaker's wrongful act, 
since the decisionmaker presumably was acting in a race- 
neutral manner against a background of societal inequality he 
did not create.IJ7 
Recognizing the difficulties involved in this approach, commen- 
tators have attempted to define schemes for limiting the scope of 
the impact rule in section 1981 cases.'4n Because of the sensitive 
balancing required, however, the courts have generally deferred 
such policy determinations to the executive and legislative de- 
partments. As Justice Powell explained, disparate impact alone 
is not sufficient to establish a statutory violation. In the case of 
title VII, he pointed out, Congress determined that "disparate 
impact is a basis for relief . . . only if the practice in question is 
not founded on 'business necessity' . . . or lacks 'a manifest rela- 
tionship to the employment in question."'149 Judicially reading 
the impact theory into sections 1981 and 1982 without the kinds 
of legislative or administrative guidelines that are present in the 
case of title VII would, in the words of Justice White, require 
courts "to balance sensitive policy considerations against each 
other-considerations which have never been addressed by any 
Congress-all under the guise of 'construing' a statute. This is a 
145. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 212 (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White used 
this argument to oppose the extension of 8 1981 to private acts of discrimination). 
146. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2758 n.44 (1978). 
147. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, at 738-39 (footnote omitted). 
148. Expanding Scope, supra note 8, at 430-32; Note, Section 1981 and Private 
Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 
1441, 1471-76 (1975). 
149. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2758 n.44 (1978) (citations 
omitted). 
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task appropriate for the Legislature, not for the Judiciary."lL" 
Legislative resolution of these issues implies that the judici- 
ary will not "be the leader in the nation's drive for racial equal- 
ity."15' I t  should not mean, however, that the disproportionate 
impact standard could never be used in race discrimination ac- 
tions brought under the Reconstruction Acts. It may be advisable 
for the Legislature to extend the standard to the earlier statutes. 
But although legislative resolution of the problem may meet the 
demands of "equality" less promptly than would a judicial solu- 
tion, the long term gains that would accrue by insisting that 
Congress rather than the courts extend the scope of sections 1981 
and 1982 may far outweigh the cost of the delay.'" For as Chief 
Justice Burger explained, society also has a keen interest in the 
separation of powers: "While '[it] is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,' . . . 
it is equally-and emphatically-the exclusive province of the 
Congress not only to formulate legislative policies . . . but also 
to establish their relative priority for the Nation."lX:' Construing 
sections 1981 and 1982 consistently with the fourteenth amend- 
ment would not only preserve the integrity of our constitutional 
150. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. a t  212 (White, J., dissenting) (Justice White used 
this argument to oppose the extension of § 1981 to  private acts of discrimination). Justice 
Powell has implied that application of the impact standard to other civil rights measures 
would require the kind of legislative mandate that existed in the case of title VII. Regents 
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2758 n.44 (1978). 
151. Proof of Purpose, supra note 2, a t  739 (footnote omitted). See Perry, supra note 
39, a t  588 & n.202. See also Brest, supra note 1, a t  53. 
152. Many commentators have addressed the question of the institutional costs in- 
volved when courts become enmeshed in political decisionmaking. See, e.g., R. BERGER, 
supra note 94, a t  409-12; D. HOROWITZ, supra note 105, a t  17-21, 255-98; Kurland, supra 
note 105. See generally P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 
(1970); Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social Services?, 50 PUB. INTEREST 64,?1 (1978); 
Kurland, Government by Judiciary, 20 MOD. AGE 358 (1976). 
153. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2301 (1978) (citation omitted) 
(alteration by the Court) (quoting Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)). The Chief 
Justice also quoted the following passage from Robert Bolt's A Man for All Seasons to 
illustrate his feelings about the serious consequences that attend judicial encroachment 
on legislative functions: 
"The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal, not what's right. And I'll stick 
to what's legal . . . . I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, 
which you find such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the 
thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester. . . . What would you do? Cut a great 
road through the law to get after the Devil? . . . And when the last law was 
down, and the Devil turned round on you-where would you hide, Roper, the 
laws all being flat? This country's planted thick with laws from coast to 
coast-Man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down . . . d'you really think 
you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the 
Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake." 
Id. a t  2302 (quoting R. BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 147 (Heinemann ed. 1967)). 
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system by deferring important policy decisions to the legislature, 
but would strengthen the legitimacy of the judicial process by 
extricating the courts from the "political task of trying to de- 
cide"154 how societal benefits and burdens should be distributed 
between blacks and whites. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The division in the lower courts on the issue of the standard 
of proof required in section 1981 and 1982 race discrimination 
cases involving facially neutral practices reflects the uncertainty 
that exists in the federal judiciary as to the direction discrimina- 
tion law should take after Washington v. Davis. While some ex- 
press concern about the restrictive impact the Davis rationale 
would have on race discrimination law if applied to section 1981 
and 1982 actions, others rely on indications by the Supreme Court 
that major policy changes would better be made by the Congress. 
The disproportionate impact theory can be a powerful tool in the 
continuing struggle to assure all disadvantaged peoples "equal 
rights under the law." The sensitive balancing of interests re- 
quired in the areas affected by sections 1981 and 1982, however, 
requires the authoritative mandate offered by a Congressional 
imprimatur. In an era when concern about the limits of judicial 
power is increasing, emphasis on legislative history and deference 
to legislative intent is appropriate. As the Chief Justice has vigor- 
ously asserted: 
Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a 
particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be 
put aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the 
meaning of an enactment is discerned and its constitutionality 
determined, the judicial process comes to an end. We do not sit 
as a committee of review, nor are we vested with the power of 
veto. Is5 
Stephen L. Fluckiger 
- 
154. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U S .  at 212 (White, J., dissenting). 
155. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 2303 (1978). 
